

Article

Artificial Intelligence and Feminist Ethics: Evaluating Firdaus' Moral Choices in Woman at Point Zero Through AI-Driven Moral Judgments

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Abstract:

This study explores the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and feminist moral theory, examining attentively the narrative of Firdaus, the main character in Nawal El Saadawi's book *Woman at Point Zero*. Living through poverty, violence, and patriarchal tyranny, Firdaus kills a pimp who tried to subjugate her in a last act of protest. The paper looks at how artificial intelligence systems based on utilitarianism, deontology, and virtual ethics of care would judge her decision, often missing the background of gendered violence. Feminist perspectives, particularly Carol Gilligan's ethics of care and intersectional justice theories, feminist viewpoints present a quite different moral lens—one that emphasises connections, autonomy, and resistance to systematic injustice. By integrating literary analysis, real-world AI case studies, and feminist critique, the study exposes how often artificial intelligence condemns behaviours like Firdaus' while feminist ethics view them as morally justified. It emphasises how present artificial intelligence systems ignore the reality of oppression and the complexity of human resistance, so they fail. In response, the article offers a fresh, feminist-informed paradigm for AI morality that stresses fairness, context, and compassion. In the end, it demands moral algorithms that honour the voices and hardships of underprivileged groups

Keywords:

Feminist Ethics, Nawal El Saadawi, *Woman at Point Zero*, Intersectional Justice, Gendered Violence, Artificial Intelligence

1. INTRODUCTION

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into the field of ethical decision-making indicates a transformative shift in how society approaches moral concerns. In handling difficult problems, artificial intelligence systems offer unparalleled scalability, consistency, and accuracy. But as these technologies progressively impact law enforcement, government, and social policy, we are beginning to see how profoundly defective they can be when confronted with the messy, layered character of human experience—especially experiences moulded by systematic inequality, gender-based violence, and acts of resistance. The ethical theories that now direct artificial intelligence—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—are derived from philosophical traditions that sometimes give

objectivity, reason, and universal standards top priority. These models are helpful for examining abstract ideas or optimising results, but they usually fall apart when faced with the lived reality of humans like Firdaus, the key person in Nawal El Saadawi's (1975) *Woman at Point Zero*. Living a lifetime of poverty, sexism, and sexual violence in mid-20th-century Egypt, Firdaus is a woman who has suffered unimaginable cruelty. It is not a pointless act of violence when she murders a pimp who tries to exert authority over her once more; rather, it is a last, extreme claim of her liberty. She uses it as a means to refuse enslavement in the future. However, a system that views her revolt as criminal rather than morally noteworthy punishes and executes her for that specific deed.

This research examines how artificial intelligence, working

under conventional ethical presumptions, would assess Firdaus's moral decisions. Together with feminist ethical theories—especially Carol Gilligan's (1982) ethics of care and the ideas of intersectional feminist justice—it lays these algorithmic judgements alongside to expose the gender biases ingrained in AI's moral thinking. When driven by traditional models, artificial intelligence often overlooks or misinterprets moral decisions resulting from injustice. Rather, it frequently supports the same social mores that already marginalise voices such as Firdaus's. Given how much effect artificial intelligence systems are beginning to have on actual decisions, this problem is even more critical. Whether by automated public policy decision-making, risk assessment algorithms in courts, or predictive policing technologies, artificial intelligence does not approach issues objectively. It captures the ideals, flaws, and priorities of its creators. Kate Crawford notes in her book *Atlas of AI* (2021) that by integrating universal principles that ignore the complicated, relational, and historical background of human life, these systems sometimes carry forward racial and gender stereotypes. For someone like Firdaus, whose behaviour defies easy moral classification, AI's inclination for abstract logic over lived experience results in serious misjudgements. Her murder of the pimp runs the danger of being interpreted as merely a disturbance of the peace, reflecting the same societal rejection that resulted in her death.

Feminist ethics, on the other hand, presents a quite different approach to interpreting morality. Emphasising compassion, connectivity, and opposition to injustice, it reinterpreted Firdaus's behaviour as an act of moral complexity. It is not only violence; it is the outcome of a life devoid of affection, protection, or acknowledgement. She is consciously trying desperately to take back authority over her life. Rigid artificial intelligence logic and the sophisticated knowledge provided by feminist ethics expose a basic gulf. AI systems now fit the patriarchal norms punishing women like Firdaus than they do with ethical frameworks acknowledging the background of her resistance. Fundamentally, this study poses a vital question: Can artificial intelligence, as we have developed it, fairly and precisely evaluate the moral decisions of someone whose life occurs outside of its basic assumptions? By means of a close comparison of feminist ethical ideas and AI-driven assessments, the research reveals the gender restrictions in how robots' "reason" morally. It makes the case for the pressing need of redesigning artificial intelligence systems such that they mirror contextual justice, equity, and care. Though Firdaus's story is firmly anchored in her cultural and historical setting—formed by colonial legacies, economic inequality, and ingrained gender roles—her disobedience speaks to global challenges against patriarchal dominance. Her remarkable remarks capture her change from a mute victim to someone who proudly claims her power and, lastly, welcomes death on her own terms: I am not a slave... I decided to pass death free. That statement demands that we reconsider how morality is interpreted in a digital environment, not only provide a personal resolution.

This essay explores Firdaus's path but also considers others. It draws on her story to make a more general comment on

the kinds of artificial intelligence systems we are producing. It contends that we cannot afford to create moral machines devoid of awareness of power relations or that minimise human judgements to formulas. Should we keep developing artificial intelligence grounded only on abstract logic, we run the danger of silencing the very voices most needed to be heard—those who oppose, who fight, and who survive. The study asks for a change in artificial intelligence ethics by examining how AI would evaluate Firdaus—perhaps labelling her a utilitarian failure, a breaker of moral law, or someone without traditional virtue—and contrasting that with feminist interpretations that affirm her agency and resistance. This study employs Firdaus's voice to expose what is at risk when machines are pushed to make moral decisions, therefore tying digital ethics with feminist literary analysis. It holds that morality cannot be reduced to code and that justice cannot be isolated from the tales people bear. Firdaus's resistance challenges ethical reasoning rather than a weakness in it. And AI has to learn how to respond if it is to really be serving justice.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and feminist moral philosophy offers rich ground for exploring how technology makes sense of complex human experiences—especially those shaped by gender-based violence and social injustice. Applying important scholarly works on AI-driven moral reasoning and feminist ethical frameworks to the figure of Firdaus in *Woman at Point Zero*, this review brings together the aim to learn how other moral systems view the ethical weight of her activities, especially her last act of resistance. We start by looking at the fundamental moral theories—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—that define AI ethics nowadays. These theories are compared with feminist viewpoints, particularly intersectional feminist justice and Carol Gilligan's ethics of caring. The comparison emphasises where each framework reflects deeper societal prejudices, where it succeeds, and where it falls short. This review sets the stage for arguing that Firdaus's narrative requires us to rethink morality in digital systems and that mainstream artificial intelligence frequently supports patriarchal notions using both El Saadawi's (1975) book and observations from feminist and AI experts.

2.1. AI Moral Reasoning: Frameworks and Critiques

AI ethics frequently depend on three significant philosophical traditions: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics (Wallach and Allen, 2009). Utilitarianism, as defined by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, prioritizes the reduction of suffering and the enhancement of pleasure (Bentham, 1996). Deontology, which is derived from the work of Immanuel Kant, emphasises the importance of adhering to moral obligations and universal regulations, such as the imperative "do not kill." Originally developed by Aristotle, virtue ethics emphasises the cultivation of virtue, the pursuit of a meaningful existence, and moral character over strict rule-following or outcome-based reasoning. Crawford (2021) challenges artificial intelligence

for reducing morality to mere computations that overlook power dynamics, endangering the perpetuation of systemic biases. The COMPAS algorithm, utilised in U.S. courts, has been demonstrated to disproportionately identify Black defendants as high-risk, indicative of biases in the training data (Angwin et al., 2016). Facial recognition systems disproportionately misidentify women and individuals of colour, hence perpetuating gender and racial inequities (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018).

These institutions provide structure and reason, but for those on the periphery especially, they frequently fall under the weight of human reality. In *Atlas of AI*, Kate Crawford (2021) challenges how these models reduce morality into rule-based computations, ignoring personal experience. She contends that artificial intelligence often removes the power dynamics influencing moral decisions, therefore supporting systems of tyranny. A utilitarian machine, for instance, would view Firdaus's deed as a net loss—two people die, and the system is left unchanged. It would discount her political and personal significance as opposition. Deontology would instantly mark her as immoral for violating the ban on murder without questioning why. Even virtue ethics is difficult; typically, patriarchal conventions dictate what constitutes "virtue." Researchers such as Mark Coeckelbergh (2020) and Vincent C. Müller (2020) note that rather than challenging current hierarchies, artificial intelligence systems typically replicate them. Like society punishing Firdaus, they often find themselves penalizing those who oppose injustice since they depend on pre-existing data and social standards. In essence, not with compassion or opposition but rather with legalism and control, AI's moral compass often aligns.

Furthermore, Virginia Held's research on feminist moral theory enhances the idea of caring beyond personal relationships to include societal and political structures. In her book *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, she says that care shouldn't just be seen as a personal feeling or duty, but as a true moral basis for building justice and society (Held, 2006). Held's point of view says that judging something to be morally right or wrong should consider how it makes people feel, how unfair things are in society, and the differences between people. When applied to Firdaus' story, this framework sees her last act not as a single crime, but as an ethically acceptable response to a life without safety, empathy, or support. From Held's point of view, Firdaus's anger is not only understandable, but also morally appropriate: it was a statement of independence in reaction to repeated neglect. This supports the idea that AI systems should be more than just logical. They should be built to understand the moral importance of relationships, power dynamics, and compassion so they can fairly judge human choices.

2.2. Feminist Ethical Views: Care and Intersectionality

Feminist ethics offers an alternative, emphasising context and relationships. Gilligan's ethics of care prioritises empathy and relational accountability over abstract rules. Virginia Held (2006) extends this to societal structures,

arguing that care is a moral foundation for justice. For Firdaus, who states, "No one had ever looked at me with kindness," her act becomes a form of self-care in a neglectful world. Intersectional feminist justice, inspired by Crenshaw (1989), considers overlapping oppressions (gender, class, colonial legacies). Hynes (2018) argues that Firdaus' act—"I killed all the men who made me what I am"—is a justified response to systemic exploitation. Macaulay (2020) suggests AI could incorporate these insights by prioritising lived experience over rigid rules. Gilligan's technique elucidates concepts when applied to Firdaus. Every guy Firdaus met saw her as an object; her uncle mistreated her, her husband beat her, and her existence was totally devoid of compassion. From this standpoint, her decision to kill is about at last choosing herself rather than only about violence. It is a moral survival act in a society that turned aside her needs. Ethics of care, as M.J. Crowe (2000) points out, enables us to view such choices not as moral lapses but as intensely human attempts to recover dignity.

Intersectional feminist justice develops on this concept but adds still another layer. It maintains that morality must consider interlocking systems of oppression—gender, class, colour, and more. Scholar M.C.C.L. Hynes uses this prism to examine artificial intelligence ethics, contending that conventional moral theories overlook how power and identity define human behaviour. Resistance is not only reasonable—it's morally justified—for someone like Firdaus, whose whole life was limited by systematic exploitation. Firdaus is not speaking about one man when she states, I killed all the men who made me what I am. She is addressing a whole structure that denigrated her. According to Fiona Macaulay, artificial intelligence can—and ought to—include these feminist insights. Instead of viewing morality as a checklist of guidelines, AI could learn to examine relationships, trauma, and power systems. Without it, we will continue to punish and misinterpret individuals like Firdaus.

2.3. Woman at Point Zero: A Literary and Ethical Case Study

El Saadawi's story places Firdaus within a patriarchal Egyptian culture influenced by colonial legacies and economic inequality. Her action transcends ordinary violence; it signifies a repudiation of subjugation, as Hynes (2018) observes: "a radical moral stance" (p. 72). Postcolonial feminist researcher Spivak (1988) characterises these actions as subaltern resistance, contesting prevailing moral paradigms. Crawford (2021) cautions that AI's inclination towards order over agency may lead to misinterpretation of narratives, whereas Macaulay (2020) promotes AI that prioritises lived experience. The *Woman at Point Zero* by El Saadawi makes a strong argument for investigating these theories. With Firdaus' existence capturing the conflict between patriarchal morality and feminist opposition, Nawal El Saadawi's *Woman at Point Zero* (1975) offers a fascinating narrative for evaluating these theories. She describes mid-20th-century Egypt as a prison of sex and class, showing Firdaus's path through abuse, prostitution, and finally agency as a microcosm of systematic gendered violence (p. 10). Secondary literature, such as Hynes (2018),

reads Firdaus's murder of the pimp as a radical moral stance: "I struck at them all" (p. 111), disorders victimhood and asserts justice (p. 72). While Müller (2020) criticises AI's anticipated rejection as a failure to understand such "structural violence", Crowe (2000) ties this with care ethics, citing her behaviour as a response to a society bereft of relationship support (p. 34). El Saadawi's text also resonates with broader feminist scholarship. While Macaulay (2020) interprets Firdaus's defiance I chose to die free (p. 112) as a demand for AI to emphasise lived experience (p. 89), Crawford (2021) utilises it subtly to show how AI's inclination for order over agency is biased. While the book's universal themes of patriarchal oppression enhance its relevance to discussions on AI ethics, the specific context of its Egyptian backdrop, including colonial legacies and economic disparity, provides a grounding for these views. Coeckelbergh (2020) argues that AI runs the danger of misjudging such narratives without contextual adaption, hence supporting the punitive social reaction Firdaus confronts (p. 67). The book addresses universal experiences of gendered oppression as well as settings particular to Egypt. Readers all throughout the world will relate to Firdaus's decision to embrace death instead of going back to slavery, therefore challenging any moral framework that cannot make sense of her rebellion.

3. RESEARCH GAPS

The literature reflects a gap. While academics recognise the moral boundaries of artificial intelligence, very few offer specific solutions, particularly from a feminist perspective. Although scholars criticise the ethical constraints of AI, few provide pragmatic remedies inspired by feminist perspectives. Firdaus' narrative serves as a tangible example to address this disparity, examining how AI may amalgamate caring and intersectionality to impartially evaluate resistance. That's why Firdaus's narrative becomes priceless. Her background offers a clear, emotionally charged case study for reconsidering artificial intelligence ethics. Researchers like Crawford and Coeckelbergh advocate for context-aware technologies. Feminist intellectuals offer the moral reasoning to construct them. When we ask artificial intelligence to evaluate the morality of resistance, Firdaus brings both sides together and shows us what is at stake—and what is feasible.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This paper investigates Firdaus's moral choices in *Woman at Point Zero* with a multi-layered method. It combines feminist ethics, simulated artificial intelligence reasoning, and literary analysis to help one better grasp how various frameworks read her story. The aim is to demonstrate how often AI systems—built around dominant ethical models—fail to understand the complexity of decisions impacted by oppression and to propose a more complicated and just alternative, feminist-informed model of AI ethics. Four phases comprise this investigation. Each contributes in different ways to help one to have a better knowledge of Firdaus's decisions and how they could be seen based on the perspective chosen. From a close reading of her story to a simulated artificial intelligence moral assessment and

finally a feminist ethical critique, the technique combines theoretical depth with practical imagination to provide both critical insight and constructive solutions.

5. LITERARY ANALYSIS

Reading *Woman at Point Zero* closely and attentively—with an eye on how Firdaus's life influences her choice to commit murder—is the first step. This is about knowing the social and emotional milieu she lives in, not only about remembering her story. Firdaus grew up in a poor, strongly patriarchal Egyptian society. Her life is violent from the start: her uncle harasses her, forces her into an abusive marriage, and coerces her into sex work. El Saadawi vividly and painfully details her path. Firdaus's choice to murder the pimp results from a lengthy history of systematic injustice and abuse rather than from sudden change. Her remarks, "Every man I met was a master" and "I would rather die than live as a slave, capture her rising awareness and rejection of remaining passive. The moral and emotional groundwork this literary reading offers will help one to grasp the later phases of research. It preserves the emphasis on Firdaus as a human being rather than only a moral "case".

5.1. Simulating AI Moral Judgements

The paper considers how an artificial intelligence system—programmed with traditional moral values—might view Firdaus's murder. This simulation employs reason grounded in the way modern artificial intelligence is developed and reasoned about in the literature, even while no real AI system is running.

- **Utilitarianism**, using outcomes, would assess Firdaus's action: one guy dies, and she is executed. From this angle, the system stays unaltered, and there is no net gain—just two fatalities. AI systems sometimes simplify moral decisions to cold math, neglecting personal meaning or symbolic opposition, as Wallach and Allen advise.
- **Deontology**, with its emphasis on rigid guidelines like "do not kill", would probably find Firdaus guilty without looking at her motivation. Müller notes that these models of artificial intelligence systems sometimes too precisely reflect the law and cannot consider moral complexity or exceptions.
- **Virtue ethics** would try to determine whether Firdaus responded out of revenge or bravery. The difficulty here, though, is that artificial intelligence lacks simple understanding of what "virtue" entails in a specific cultural setting. Such tests, as Wallach and Allen point out, are readily impacted by the views of whoever coded the machine—which usually reflects dominant, patriarchal ideas.

This phase reveals how conventional artificial intelligence ethics often mirror the same moral criticism Firdaus encountered in the actual world. It also emphasises the requirement of a distinct sort of ethical reasoning that recognises context rather than only results or guidelines.

5.2. Feminist Ethical Analysis

Here the investigation shifts to feminist ethics in order to offer a more complete picture. Gilligan's ethics of care and intersectional feminist justice help one reevaluate Firdaus's murder not as a straightforward transgression but rather as a profoundly moral reaction to years of abuse and neglect. Crowe's explanations of Gilligan's care-based ethics centre on relational experience. From this perspective, a lifetime of being denied love, protection, and respect shapes Firdaus' choice rather than reason. Her meditation, *I was alone, always alone*, reveals how moral terrain is shaped by care and lack. Her last act turns into a means of self-care in a world never experienced. Inspired by Crenshaw (1989) and implemented here through Hynes, intersectional justice emphasises the overlapping nature of several kinds of oppression. Firdaus was impoverished, illiterate, and underpowered in many respects, not only as a woman. Her action, therefore, can be interpreted as a counterpoint to all the forces seeking to eradicate her identity. Her assertion, *I struck at them all*, captures the depth of their opposition. Any moral assessment, Macaulay contends—especially by artificial intelligence—must take such structural injustice into account if it is to be fair. This final stage illustrates how feminist ethics lets us view Firdaus not as a killer but as someone who acted with agency and intention inside a flawed environment.

5.3. Bringing it All Together: Comparative Synthesis and Ethical Redesign

At last, the study aggregates the ideas from feminist ethics and artificial intelligence models, stressing areas of conflict as well as possible alignment. It makes arguments based on criticisms from Crawford and Müller that AI as it exists is structurally biased against persons like Firdaus. She responds, *They will hang me at dawn*, reflecting the same moral rigidity that preceded her execution. But the feminist prism presents another. *I killed to live*, by saying Firdaus perfectly expresses moral opposition. What violates one system becomes a statement of life in another. Inspired by Hynes and Macaulay, the paper offers an ethical paradigm for artificial intelligence that gives justice and caring priority rather than merely guidelines or computations. Such an arrangement would comprise

- **Relational inputs** (e.g., background, trauma, social history)
- **Metrics for oppression** (e.g., gender, poverty, systemic violence)
- **Adaptability to nuance**, including qualitative data like testimony

This last phase is related to vision. It sees what artificial intelligence could be if it really sought to comprehend humans like Firdaus—not minimize them to code violations but rather acknowledge them as moral agents with great stories.

6. ANALYSIS

This section analyzes Firdaus' moral choices, contrasting AI-driven judgments with feminist perspectives, and

integrates real-world AI examples. The study shows a striking difference by contrasting simulated artificial intelligence ethical reasoning with feminist approaches: although artificial intelligence follows guidelines and results, feminist ethics considers lived experience, context, and resistance. We start by looking at Firdaus's life—the events that brought her to this point—then we enter the minds of several moral systems, both feminist and conventional. At the end of this section—left unaltered as asked—a table clearly and comparatively arranges these ideas.

6.1. The Moral Landscape of Firdaus

Firdaus' life in mid-20th-century Egypt is influenced by destitution, maltreatment, and colonial legacies that solidified patriarchal dominance (Spivak, 1988). Her uncle's maltreatment, a violent marriage, and coerced sex labour culminate in her murdering a pimp who seeks to exert control over her. Her assertion, *"I felt a new strength surging through me,"* signifies agency rather than simple aggression. This action, grounded in a repudiation of servitude—*"I would prefer death to a life of slavery"*—requires a moral framework that addresses systematic oppression. This situation is about metamorphosis as much as violence. *I felt only a strange elation; I did not feel regret or fear*, she notes. She acts of her own will for the first time here. Her thoughts, *All the men I did get to know filled me with bitterness and hatred*, are not only personal but also a critique of a whole system. Her deed is characterized by her rejection of being a slave anymore: *I would rather die than live as a slave's moral stance against a life that has never allowed her dignity is not only retribution*. Rooted in El Saadawi's compelling story, this rich background calls for more than just abstract ethical guidelines; it calls for an ethics able to make sense of complexity, suffering, and resistance.

6.2. AI-Driven Moral Judgements

Now let's examine how AI dependent on conventional ethical systems might evaluate Firdaus.

6.3. Utilitarianism

This model would attempt to assess Firdaus's actions' repercussions. She is executed when one person dies—the pimp. Still the same is the system. From this perspective, there is net damage: two lives lost and no more general social development. This approach does, however, overlook the symbolic and personal relevance of Firdaus' behaviour. *I felt a new strength surge through me*, she recalls, but utilitarian math has no room for her recovering autonomy. This form of ethical reasoning, as Kate Crawford cautions, eliminates power and passion from the equation—all numbers, no complexity.

6.4. Deontology

The rule here is basic: do not kill. Firdaus defied that guideline. Final Thought: End of Story AI applying this paradigm would probably replicate the court system punishing her to death. It would not take her moral complexity of decision, her suffering, or her motivations into account. Deontology has no idea what to do with that

level of desperation; Firdaus explains, I had to kill him... it was the only way I could be free. It applies to everyone, even if the system has never fairly applied those criteria. Deontological artificial intelligence, as academics such as Müller highlight, often supports the identical standards that first persecuted Firdaus.

6.5. Ethics from Virtue

This paradigm emphasises character; was Firdaus acting with excess and wrath or bravery? I am not a criminal... I killed to live, her argument suggests a moral strength, a desire to live on her own terms. Virtue ethics in artificial intelligence suffers, though, in that it relies on the programmer's notion of "virtue." What constitutes courage in one culture may seem like hostility in another. Given that Firdaus's defiance— I am not afraid—doesn't fit conventional, usually patriarchal conceptions of female morality, one could discount it. Once more, the system misses her totally.

6.6. Feminist Ethical Perspective

Let us now observe how feminist ethics responds—beginning with compassion and then advancing towards justice.

6.7. Ethics of Attention

Starting with "who was there for Firdaus?" Carol Gilligan's framework asks Who treated her with love, kindness,

or encouragement? No one responds. Nobody had ever looked at me with kindness, she recalls. In ethics of care, this is vital. From her vantage point, her choice to kill is not motivated by even retribution or power. This is about at last acting for herself. She states, "I chose my own path." This is a remarkable display of self-care in a world where she was always told what to do, always used by others. Though not tidy or simple, it is morally significant. This model asks not, "Did she follow the rules?" "It queries, "What did she need? What was the world denying her? And doing this provides a far more sympathetic and contextual interpretation of her behaviour.

6.8. Intersectional Feminist Equality

This framework goes considerably farther. It regards Firdaus as someone at the junction of colonial histories, class, and gender, not only as a woman. Her deed, "I killed all the men who made me what I am," is political as much as personal. Intersectional justice acknowledges that Firdaus is reacting to a whole system that tried to shatter her, not only to one individual. As Hynes and Crawford contend, any moral assessment outside of that system is inadequate. Firdaus sees only one means to recover her humanity: her murder is resistance. Unless modified, artificial intelligence cannot understand that level of intricacy. It perceives one act rather than a lifetime of violence. Still, intersectional ethics calls for more. It calls for us to see the whole picture.

Table 1: The table below organizes the evaluations, highlighting key quotes, judgments, and scholarly insights for clarity and comparison.

Framework	Key Quote from Firdaus	Judgment	Scholarly Insight
Utilitarianism	"I felt a new strength surging through me" (p. 107)	Condemns: Net harm (two deaths, no change)	Wallach & Allen (2009): "Aggregate utility over context" (p. 85); Crawford (2021): "Fails to encode power" (p. 45)
Deontology	"I had to kill him... it was the only way I could be free" (p. 108)	Condemns: Violates "do not kill"	Coeckelbergh (2020): Rule-based (p. 67); Müller (2020): Legalistic bias (p. 112)
Virtue Ethics	"I am not a criminal... I killed to live" (p. 110)	Ambiguous: Courage vs. excess	Wallach & Allen (2009): Culturally defined virtues (p. 125); Crawford (2021): Normative bias (p. 48)
Ethics of Care	"No one had ever looked at me with kindness" (p. 92)	Justifies: Self-care amid neglect	Crowe (2000): Relational priority (p. 34); Macaulay (2020): "Relational outcomes" (p. 89)
Intersectional Justice	"I killed all the men who made me what I am" (p. 111)	Justifies: Resistance to oppression	Hynes (2018): Empowerment (p. 72); Crawford (2021): Context-aware ethics (p. 60)

7. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

When one considers various points of view, the difference is startling. Designed on universal norms and results, artificial intelligence systems denigrate Firdaus. They pay more attention to her actions than to her motivations. They propagate the same social mores that penalised her first. Feminist ethics, however, presents another picture. It finds her acting as the result of a life spent battling to survive. Feminism sees someone recovering agency, whereas

artificial intelligence notes a rule-breaker. Feminism sees someone; artificial intelligence sees a problem. Firdaus's narrative highlights the limits of our present artificial intelligence models as well as the opportunities to rethink morality in a more human manner.

8. DISCUSSION

The collision of AI and feminist ethics highlights a significant disparity: AI perpetuates patriarchal standards,

whereas feminist ethics endorses Firdaus' autonomy. The dependence of AI on universal frameworks—demonstrated by systems such as COMPAS, which discriminates against marginalised groups—neglects to account for her resistance. Feminist ethics perceives her action as a reaction to systematic neglect and oppression, rooted in Egypt's patriarchal and colonial framework. From Firdaus's life narrative and artificial intelligence's moral reasoning to the insights provided by feminist ethics, this conversation aggregates all we have thus far examined. Examining her behaviour via these opposing perspectives reveals not only how different moral systems evaluate her but also what that suggests about the worldviews ingrained in them. The fundamental truth of this debate is that feminist ethics offers space to interpret her choice as one of power, autonomy, and resistance, whereas orthodox AI ethics usually reinforces the same societal standards that condemned Firdaus in the first place. This gap has significant ramifications for our creation of ethical artificial intelligence in the actual world, not only theoretical.

8.1. Addressing Counterarguments

Critics could argue that feminist ethics infuses subjectivity into artificial intelligence, thereby leading to conflicting judgements. Rule-based systems guarantee predictability, which is essential in legal contexts. Nonetheless, Macaulay (2020) argues that inflexible regulations frequently sustain unfairness by disregarding context. An AI guided by feminist principles could employ probabilistic models to reconcile consistency with flexibility, akin to certain natural language processing systems that adjust to contextual signals (Devlin et al., 2019). When artificial intelligence systems, applying conventional models, assess someone like Firdaus, their findings usually reflect society's punishment rather than moral knowledge. For example, utilitarianism views no systematic change and merely two deaths—hers and the pimp's—as the outcome is negative. It utterly ignores the personal metamorphosis underlying her comment, I felt a new strength surging through me. In this sense, the empowerment she experiences does not fit as a moral good. Crawford issues a warning regarding this issue: when artificial intelligence neglects power, it also neglects justice. Deontological thinking likewise condemns her openly for violating the ban on killing. Driven by this concept, artificial intelligence reflects the judicial system that resulted in her execution. They will hang me at dawn, she says—but neither the law nor the algorithm probes her behaviour as it stands. Müller calls this the “power reinforcement” issue of artificial intelligence: it follows guidelines without challenging the power structures supporting them. Here even virtue ethics finds difficulty. Not scared, Firdaus says, displaying a sort of moral bravery. But virtue interpretation by artificial intelligence systems depends on cultural standards, many of which are patriarchal. Her strength may thus be written off as either excessive or harmful rather than moral. Crawford calls this the punishment of resistance—a system that ignores bravery coming from the periphery.

Feminist ethics reverses this altogether, though. It sees her act as survival rather than as transgression. Whoever took care of Firdaus? The ethics of care asks. No one had

ever looked at me with kindness; her response tells us everything. Her choice turns into a last stand in a society long gone from her, a self-defence. Macaulay proposes redesigning artificial intelligence to value these relational realities—outcomes depending on care rather than control.

Intersectional feminist justice reveals how more than just gender shapes Firdaus' story. She is also underdeveloped, illiterate, and underprivileged due by more general socioeconomic causes. Crawford both contend that moral judgement must incorporate power and context; her murder of the pimp is a blow against all of it—I killed all the men who made me what I am. Without that, artificial intelligence sides with tyranny.

This variation in interpretation exposes a fundamental weakness in present artificial intelligence: it cannot manage pushback. It knows rules and outcomes, but it has no idea what to do with disobedience—especially when that disobedience comes from someone society has already driven to the outskirts.

8.2. Implications of AI Ethics

What then does all this tell us about the construction of artificial intelligence systems intended to make moral decisions? Firstly, artificial intelligence's reliance on limited moral frameworks means it sometimes ignores the complexity of actual human life—especially life moulded by injustice. For someone like Firdaus, whose every choice is entangled in systems of power, artificial intelligence provides no justice. Using utilitarianism, her suffering is discounted. Deontology penalises her for disobeying laws created by the very people who mistreated her. Virtue ethics reads her bravery wrong. These are not only theoretical worries; they also represent actual problems in the way artificial intelligence is now applied in fields including social services, computerised sentencing, and predictive policing. Conversely, feminist ethics presents a more realistic, flexible, and sympathetic approach to assessing moral deeds. Care ethics tells us that meaningful relationships, either present or absent, impact people's decisions. Intersectional justice helps us to examine the systems influencing people's chances and choices. Feminist ethics, shortly said, allows for complexity. It favours agency above compliance. And it gives real experience top priority over theoretical ideas. These are exactly the principles lacking in present artificial intelligence design.

8.3. A Feminist-Based AI Model

We must envision what an alternative type of artificial intelligence—one that actively confronts rather than merely replicates prevailing power structures—may look like in the future. This study suggests a feminist-aligned AI ethics paradigm that ties together intersectionality and care into the center of its reasoning. Inspired by Macaulay's and Hynes's writings, this model would make use:

1. Relational Inputs: Employ natural language processing to examine narratives of trauma or care, like sentiment analysis models (Devlin et al., 2019).
2. Metrics for Oppression: Integrate socio-economic

and historical data, akin to fairness-aware algorithms (Dwork et al., 2012).

3. Adaptive Reasoning: Utilise contextual modelling to modify ethical weights in accordance with power dynamics, as suggested by Hynes (2018).

Such a system could see Firdaus's act, I killed to live, not as a breach but rather as a kind of protest. It would make sense of her decision as a human endeavour to recover agency following years of persecution. When she declares,

"I chose to die free," it would hear her and identify her not as a criminal but as a moral rebellion. This is not only a conjecture. Legalistically, artificial intelligence could apply this paradigm to explain why underprivileged individuals violate laws. In social systems, it could enable the creation of responsive, nonjudging support rather than punitive support. It would bring us from rule-following machines to systems of ethical care systems that listen before they evaluate.

Table 2: Feminist Ethical Evaluations vs. Artificial Intelligence

Perspective	Key Quote	Evaluation	Implication	Scholarly Support
Utilitarianism (AI)	"I felt a new strength surging through me" (p. 107)	Condemns: Net harm, no systemic change	Erases personal agency, reinforces status quo	Wallach & Allen (2009, p. 83); Crawford (2021, p. 45)
Deontology (AI)	"I had to kill him... it was the only way I could be free" (p. 108)	Condemns: Rule violation	Upholds patriarchal punishment	Coeckelbergh (2020, p. 67); Müller (2020, p. 112)
Virtue Ethics (AI)	"I am not afraid" (p. 110)	Ambiguous: Courage vs. excess	Struggles with gendered norms	Wallach & Allen (2009, p. 125); Crawford (2021, p. 48)
Ethics of Care	"No one had ever looked at me with kindness" (p. 92)	Justifies: Self-care amid neglect	Values relational context over rules	Crowe (2000, p. 34); Macaulay (2020, p. 89)
Intersectional Justice	"I killed all the men who made me what I am" (p. 111)	Justifies: Resistance to oppression	Recognizes systemic power, affirms agency	Hynes (2018, p. 72); Crawford (2021, p. 60)

Firdaus's narrative finally exposes something quite strong. Like it is today, artificial intelligence lacks understanding of resistance. It treats it harshly. By contrast, feminist ethics respects it. That contrast points us to where the work has to be done so that the systems we create reflect the complexity, suffering, and power of actual life.

9. CONCLUSION

As presented in *Woman at Point Zero*, Firdaus' story demonstrates AI's inability to understand moral complexity produced by injustice. Conventional frames denounce her, whereas feminist ethics validate her autonomy. By incorporating caring and intersectionality, AI may develop to elevate under-represented voices, ensuring that technology promotes justice rather than suppressing dissent, as exemplified by Firdaus. Her last deed, killing the pimp, is not only a personal choice but also a declaration: she will no longer live as someone else's property. She explains, "*I decided to die free*." This decision goes against the wisdom of traditional morality—and that disobedience reveals the flaws in the ethical frameworks directing current artificial intelligence. The ethical theories most often applied in artificial intelligence—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—all fall short in really grasping Firdaus. While utilitarian theory gauges results, it ignores what it takes to recover one's humanity. Deontology holds that regardless of the cost, regulations should never be broken. Virtue ethics asks whether her behaviour conforms to ideal character traits too often defined by patriarchal

norms. As the study reveals, all three points of view risk labelling Firdaus not as brave or moral but rather as simply wrong. Her death sentence came from the same logic. By comparison, feminist ethics presents quite another picture. Gilligan's ethics of care let us view Firdaus as someone who had no choice but to take care of herself when no one else did. Her proclamation, "No one had ever looked at me with kindness," becomes important in helping one to comprehend her behaviour. Intersectional justice arranges her narrative in the larger framework of poverty, gender, and power. Her lament, "I killed all the men who made me what I am," goes beyond the pimp. It is a declaration against a society that denied her freedom, voice, and individuality.

This discrepancy emphasises something fundamental: artificial intelligence cannot rely merely on conventional models if it is to make ethical decisions in ways that are really just. It has to develop. AI has to grow to be beyond rules and results. It has to learn to perceive people in context, particularly those whose decisions are moulded by lifetime tyranny. This book presents a road ahead. Inspired by the ideas of intersectionality and care ethics, it suggests a fresh sort of artificial intelligence morality based on human experience that listens before it judges and that views opposition as a moral deed. Under this paradigm, AI would view Firdaus as a human person whose last deed was a kind of rebellious dignity rather than as a criminal to be punished. Her voice, echoing over decades and boundaries, "*I killed to live*" asks us not only to reassess how we evaluate

individuals but also how we create robots that do the same. Artificial intelligence must represent the kind of ethics that does not eliminate the most vulnerable as technology gets more ingrained in law, policy, and daily life. It must,

instead, magnify their stories. Next, digital ethics needs to be addressed here. Moreover, Firdaus's legacy can guide the path.

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